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I.  Introduction and conclusions 
On the initiative ·of the French Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance, Mr Arthuis, a 
number of suggestions were put forward at the informal Ecofin Council meeting in Verona 
on  12 and  13 April  aimed  at  "reinforcing  convergence  and  combating  currency 
fluctuations". They were put forward within the framework of the move to the third stage 
of Economic and Monetary Union and the  relation between participating Member States 
(the  "ins")  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  not  yet  participating  Member States  and 
Member States with an opt-out possibility (the "pre-ins") on the other. 
Mr Arthuis proposed first that a way be found of  ensuring "that countries whose currencies 
depreciated  did  not  receive  larger  payments  from  the  Structural  Funds  as  a  result  of 
conversion  into  national  currency.  Consideration  might  be  given,  for  example,  to 
reprogramming payments to  such countries on the basis of changes in the real exchange 
rate." 
Mr Arthuis  further  proposed  that  "a  link  be  established  between  payments  from  the 
Structural Funds and macroeconomic policies pursued in the Member States. In the run-up 
to  Economic and Monetary Union, the solidarity obligation and the Union budget should 
take  account of the  efforts made to  achieve  convergence.  It  might thus  be  possible to 
proceed on the basis of the arrangements already introduced for  the payment of aid from 
the  Cohesion Fund,  which  can  he  suspended  in  the  event  of non-compliance  with  the 
individual  recommendations  addressed  to  each  Member State  with  an  excessive 
government deficit." 
The Commission agreed to study these ideas, as well as the other suggestions made at the 
same informal  Council  meeting.  As  regards  the  latter,  the  Commission will  present  its 
contributions  in  due time  for  the  European  Council  in  Dublin,  in  accordance  with  the 
requests from the European Council in Madrid and Florence. Enhanced convergence is an 
essential clement of the relationship between the ins and the pre-ins.  In addition, Article 
109  M  of  the  Treaty  states  that  the  provision  "each  Member State  shall  treat  its 
exchange-rate policy as  a  matter of common interest"  applies  to  Member States  with  a 
derogation in the third stage. 
Ensuring  a  durable  and  harmonious  growth  process  within  a  well  functioning  internal 
market  requires  that  Member States  respect  the  objective  of economic  convergence.  A 
policy  framework  that  fosters  budgetary  discipline  could  contribute  to  preventing 
disruptive economic effects from  movements in  exchange rates  between the euro and the 
currencies of the "pre-ins". However, proposals aimed at modulating the Structural Funds 
have to be seen in the light of  the following constraints: 
c  It would be impossible to modify the Structural Funds' regulations before the end of' 
1999 or change the operation of the Community budget before the third stage of  EMU. 
- 1 -A change in the current Structural Funds' reeulations would not only require ummimity 
but  would  also  run  counter  to  the  principle  of legitimate  expectations  for  all  the 
on-going programmes. 
o  The Commission will put forward a communication on the future financial framework 
for the period after 1999 after the conclusion of the IGC.  Individual elements of this 
package will not in any case be considered before that date in order not to prejudge the 
overall consistency and coherence of  the package. 
o  The use of the ECU in the Structural Funds is part of the "acquis communautaire". It 
would be wholly inappropriate, in view of the changeover to  the euro,  to  introduce 
increased usc of national currencies through complex mechani.sms in the Community 
budget.  Moreover, given the  intention of non-participating Member States to join as  · 
soon as  possible, an effort to  introduce such mechanisms would be disproportionate 
compared to the fact that they would be temporary. 
o  The introduction of the euro as the single currency will reduce the existing exchange 
rate risk for the Community budget. It would therefore be inappropriate to  introduce 
new mechanisms, such as modulating payments on the basis of fluctuations in nominal 
exchange rates, which by themselves would imply a further exchange rate risk for the 
Community budget. 
o  Finally, it should be borne in mind that no new criteria for entry into stage 3 of EMU 
should be established. 
Further technical considerations arc provided in the following two chapters of  this working 
document, of  which the main conclusions are: 
o  As for the proposal to  link appropriations from  Structural Funds to  the evolution of 
real  exchange  rates,  it  is  not  an  efficient  approach  to  achieving  its  objectives. 
Sanctions on real depreciations regardless of their reasons might punish countries that 
stabilized their economies. Nominal depreciations arc not always or exclusively due to 
loose  economic policies.  In  all  cases,  arbitrary  technical  choices  on measuring the 
evolution of exchange rates and on alternatives of implementation would have to  be 
taken that might lead to significantly different results. Finally, further decisions would 
have  to  be  taken  regarding countries with  appreciating currencies and the  extent to 
which payments to countries with depreciating currencies would have to be reduced. 
o  The  objective  of the  Structural  Funds  to  foster  economic  and  social  cohesion  is 
broader than the  objective of nominal convergence. As for the proposal to introduce 
macro-economic conditionality for the Structural Funds, it is found that their medium-
and long-term character would not be properly reflected in the existing mechanism of 
conditionality  in  the  Cohesion  Fund.  Furthermore,  given the  size of the  Structural 
Funds,  a  suspension  could  have  disproportionate  effects  across  Member States  or 
when made independent of the size of the excessive deficit, with the serious risk of 
lending  to  adverse  effects on the  catching-up process.  Furthermore,  there  would  be 
important practical problems to  be  solved given the principle of programming which 
implies a certain continuity in  Community support. Finally, main beneficiaries of the 
Structural Funds arc regions and certain social groups (e.g. unemployed) that must not 
be penalized. 
-2-II.  Linking appropriations from the Structural Funds 
to the evolution of the real exchange rate 
1.  The present situation 
At present,  overall  budgetary appropriations for  the  Structural  Funds arc  expressed and 
contracted in ECU terms. The usc of the ECU in the Structural Funds and its modalities as 
established by Article 12 and Annex II  of Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93 of 20 July 1993 
(Framework Regulation) and by Articles 21  and 22 of Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93 of 20 
July 1993 (Coordination Regulation) are part ofthc "acquis communautairc". It is the result 
of  intense efforts towards increased Community integration. 
All other things being equal a nominal depreciation will raise a Member State's potential 
appropriations  expressed  in  national  currency.  For  on-going  programmes  and  projects, 
Community co-financing assistance would in principle not exceed the initially fixed share 
of the costs actually incurred in  national currency for the set of measures. A depreciation 
will,  however,  create  an  unused  margin  in  ECU  that  is  determined  by  the  size  of the 
depreciation itself and the extent to which the depreciation increases costs of projects and 
influences other macroeconomic variables.  Where this  occurred  in  the' past,  this  unused 
margin has often been employed to increase co-financing ratios for projects, in particular at 
the end of  the programming periods, in order to prevent a loss of  appropriations. 
Any modification of  the present regulations, which will require unanimity in the Council as 
regards  the  Framework  Regulation  and  qualified  majority  as  regards  the  Coordination 
Regulation,  would  have  to  consider  several  economic,  technical  and  symmetry/equity 
aspects. 
2.  Economic considerations 
Real currency depreciation can be caused by a decline in the relative level of prices/costs 
and/or by a nominal depreciation. 
A decline in the relative level of  prices or costs is in normal circumstances an indication of 
the success of policies aiming at the reduction of inflation or unit labour costs. In Ireland, 
for instance, there has been no nominal depreciation of  the Irish pound relative to the other 
Union currencies between 1987 and the first quarter of 1996 (sec table 1  ). Nevertheless, the 
real effective exchange rate based on unit labour costs in the manufacturing sector declined 
by more than 32% due to a rise in productivity in Irish manufacturing. A modulation of the 
Structural Funds should avoid punishing Member States that have had success in reducing 
unit labour costs. It would thus be necessary to ensure that only those countries would be 
concerned whose currencies had also depreciated in nominal terms and to take into account 
the causes for a real depreciation in each case. 
Nominal depreciations do  not always occur because of a deficient macroeconomic policy 
in the country concerned. It can be due to speculation based on the market's perception of 
political instability or to other short-term and less quantifiable factors such as, for example, 
self-fulfilling market expectations or developments outside the European Union (including 
fluctuations  in  the  value  of the  US  dollar).  Even  if inadequate macroeconomic  policies 
warrant a currency's depreciation, markets tend to overshoot and the resulting (larger than 
necessary)  depreciation  will  be  corrected  in  due  time.  The  Italian  lira,  after  an  initial 
depreciation of  23% as from mid 1  992 to mid  199-~, depreciated further by 12% against the 
other European currencies between february and  April  1995. This nominal depreciation 
- 3 -was followed by a correction between April and September 1995 when the lira appreciated 
by 11%.  Nominal depreciations arc  thus  not  necessarily and exclusively policy-induced 
and can be mitigated in due time. 
In  addition,  the  suggested  modulation  of Structural  Funds'  spending  on  the  basis  of 
currency  fluctuations,  however,  would  risk  making  the  "pre-ins"  participating  in  the 
currency arrangement reluctant to devalue their currency, even if such a devaluation were 
justified by fundamentals and in the common interest ofthe Union Member States. Thus, a 
direct link between monetary and structural policies would be created. 
3.  Technical considerations 
Several technical issues concerning the measurement of the evolution of exchange rates 
would need to be resolved, such as the currencies of reference and the period of  reference. 
In addition, a deflator has to be chosen for the calculation of real exchange rates. Finally, 
alternatives to modulate payments on the basis of  fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate 
would also involve several problems. These technical choices arc by nature arbitrary and 
will lead to significantly different results. 
First,  it  would  be  necessary  to  define  the  currency  or  currencies of reference,  against 
which the depreciation would be measured. The broadest possible measure would be  the 
effective  exchange  rate  relative  to  the  industrial  countries  (both  inside  and  outside  the 
European Union).  A  second option would  be  the effective exchange rate  relative to  the 
European Union as a whole. A third and more narrow option would be to use the bilateral 
exchange rate against the euro. The first two measures are generally not that different in 
terms of outcome. Since 1987, the Irish pound, for example, has depreciated in real terms 
by  32% relative  to  both  the  industrial  countries  and  the  European  Union  as  a  whole. 
Choosing the third option, however, could have major implications. As an indication, the 
real bilateral exchange rate of the Irish pound against the German mark has decreased by 
41% since 1987. 
Second, when considering currency fluctuations, one needs to decide on a starting point. 
The choice ofreference period is important, but also arbitrary. Recent Commission studies 
used 1987 as reference period. However, this should not be seen as implying that exchange 
rates  prevailing  in  this  reference  period  were  in  equilibrium.  Rather,  the  stability  of 
exchange rates throughout the period 1987 to  1992 seemed to indicate that the rates of the 
Louvre  Accord of January  1987  were  appropriate  and  that  at  this  time  an  international 
balance was struck.  In other words,  imbalances slowly began to  build  up  thereafter and 
1987 could be considered as a suitable basis for analysis. However, what would seem to be 
an appropriate choice for the European Union as a whole would not necessarily be the best 
choice for each individual Member state. The importance of  the choice of reference period 
can best be illustrated by another example. 
In the first quarter of 1996, the real effective exchange rate
1 of the Spanish peseta showed 
an  8Yl%  increase  compared  to  1987  (see  table  1).  Compared  with  the  third  quarter of 
1992
2
, however, the peseta's real exchange rate had declined by 14%. 
1.  Real effective exchange rate relative to the European Union as a whole based on unit labour costs in 
manufacturing. 
2.  The third quarter of 1992 marks the beginning of the ERM crises uf 1994 and 1993. 
-4 -Third,  a  decision  would have  to  be  taken on the  price  or  cost  deflator  to  be  used to 
transform  nominal  exchange rates  into  real  rates.  In  order to provide a  comprehensive 
assessment of a country's price and cost competitiveness within the European Union, the 
Commission normally considers the following five deflators: ( 1) the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI); (2) the GOP deflator; (3) the price deflator of  exports of goods and services; (4) unit 
labour costs in the economy as a whole; and (5) unit labour costs in manufacturing. This 
last deflator is most commonly used  in  the analysis of international cost competitiveness, 
as a  large part of international trade is  trade in  manufacturing products.  However, which 
deflator  would  be  the  most  suitable  for  the  purpose  of modulating  Stmctural  Funds' 
spending in the Member States is not immediately clear. The choice to be made will have 
considerable implications as can be  illustrated by  the example of Ireland: while the real 
exchange rate of the Irish pound based on unit labour costs in manufacturing has declined 
by 32% since 1987, the real exchange rate based on the CPI has declined by 8% only. 
Finally, the possibility to  modulate payments on the  basis of  fluctuations  in  the  nominal 
exchange rate  would also involve several technical problems, including those mentioned 
above such as reference currency and starting point. It should also be taken into account 
that no mechanism should be introduced which would increase the currency risk for the 
Community budget. 
If the overall envelope for the Financial Perspectives period were to be defined as the sum 
of the annual appropriations expressed in national currency and calculated at the exchange 
rate  prevailing  at  the  beginning of the  financial  perspectives  period,  currency  changes 
would no longer have an effect on the nominal national currency equivalent. Although such 
a modulation would probably provide the right incentives not to  depreciate, it  would also 
cause a continuous reduction in payments expressed in euro to  some of the most lagging 
and least competitive regions of the Union:  for  instance, the nominal effective exchange 
rate of  the Greek drachma declined by more than 47% between 1987 and the first quarter of 
1996, while during the same period the real effective exchange rate of the drachma rose by 
25%,  implying  a  25%  reduction  in  the  cost  competitiveness  (sec  table 1  ).  Moreover, 
currency changes would be reflected in the Community budget via a lower (depreciation) 
or  higher  (appreciation)  curo  equivalent  which  would  involve  additional  risks  for  the 
Community budget. 
In  addition,  it  would  implicitly  be  assumed  that  the  exchange  rates  prevailing  at  the 
beginning of the financial  perspectives period were not misaligned. No distinction would 
be made whether a depreciation/appreciation is  policy-induced or not. Nor would the issue 
of  excessive fluctuations during the financial perspectives period he explicitly addressed or 
that of unintended  changes, in  real  tcnm, of spending on Structural  Funds.  ln addition, 
double accounting in the Community budget would run counter to the efforts to introduce 
the Euro in the widest context and as fast as possible. 
The introduction of a "double ceiling" both in curo and in national currency terms would 
eliminate the currency risk, but introduce further complications and not solve any of the 
other  problems.  Neither  would  a  CAP-like  system  of agri-monetary  adjustments  to 
Structural Fund appropriations be appropriate in  view of tht:  irrelevance of its underlying 
logic for the case at hand and its prohibitively complicated nature. 
- 5 -4.  Symmetry/equity considerations 
While the proposal is clear about the consequences of a real currency depreciation (i.e.  a 
decline  in the  allocation of the  Structural  Funds  to  the  country  concerned),  it  docs  not 
mention what should happen in case of a real currency appreciation. The rationale of a rise 
in payments to countries with an appreciating currency can be questioned. Depending on 
the  composition  of "ins"  and  "pre-ins",  the  total  of Structural  Funds'  payments  to  all 
Member States together would vary with the  fluctuations  in  currency markets and could 
cause  a  significant  change  in  total  Structural  Funds'  expenditures.  The  suggested  re-
programming  would  thus  imply  the  need  for  an  appropriate  budgetary  adjustment 
mechanism for the Structural Funds. 
If the only objective is  to  avoid giving a depreciating country an advantage in terms of 
increased payments in national currency, it should be taken into account that most projects 
require  imports from  other Member States and  a depreciation will  thus  induce a  rise in 
expenditure expressed in national currency. In order to avoid a real cut-back in investment 
and  a  disruption  of long-term  planning,  the  real  depreciation  would  only  have  to  be 
partially reflected in a decline of  the Structural Funds' spending for this country. 
III.  Conditionality nnd the Structural Funds 
1.  The legal situation regarding the Structural Funds 
Article 130a of the EC Treaty stipulates that "in order to promote its overall harmonious 
development,  the  Community  shall  develop  and  pursue  its  actions  leading  to  the 
strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular, the Community shall aim 
at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the  various regions and  the 
backwardness of the least-favoured regions, including rural areas". Article 130b assigns to 
the  Structural Funds  the  task  of  supporting  the  achievement  of  this  objective  of 
strengthening economic and social cohesion. 
Within  this  framework,  the  regulations  laying  down  the  tasks,  priority  objectives  and 
organizational arrangements of the Structural Funds were adopted in  1993 on the basis of 
the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992, which had set the 
financial perspective in ECU for the period from 1993 to  1999 and the main guidelines for 
structural  measures,  in  particular the  fact  that  "the  basic  principles  laid  down  in 1988 
(concentration, programming, partnership and additionality) should continue to  guide the 
implementation of the Structural Funds". These provisions relating to the Structural Funds 
will remain in force until 31  December 1999. 
The  introduction  of  conditionality  would  therefore  necessitate  amendments  to  the 
framework  Regulation  and  even  to  the  other  regulations  involved.  According  to 
Article 130d of the Treaty, the Council would have to act unanimously on a proposal from 
the Commission after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament and after consulting 
the Economic nnd Social Committee nnd the Committee of  the Regions. 
A propoi>al  to  introduce a  fifth  basic principle for  the  opc::ntion of the  Structural  Funds 
could prove difficult to negotiate within a framework requiring unanimity. This would also 
entail the risk of  rcop~ninn discu:Jsions on other provisions, particularly those rel2lting  to 
nd.ii  tio~'lli  ty. 
• 6-Furthermore, a re-examination of the basic principles underlying the existing legislation 
!'lnd  the  introduction of a  new principle governing  the  operation of the Stmctural Funds 
would  be contrary to the conclusions of the  Edinburgh European Council and  would be 
incompatible with the principle of  legitimate expectations (non-retroactivity). 
2.  Main implications 
Independently  of  the  lecnl  implications,  the  introduction  of  conditionality  for  the 
Structural Funds  should  be  assessed  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  macroeconomic 
consequences and in relation to the objectives and functioning of  the Funds. 
(n)  Economic consequences 
The  conditionality  proposed  raises  the  question  of the  link  between  the  convergence 
criteria  and  structural  policy.  The  aim  of the  proposed  conditionality  is  to  encourage 
nominal convergence, and in  particular budgetary  discipline,  which is  a  precondition of 
lasting growth in addition to providing a means of access to the third stage of  EMU. 
This  objcctiv~ would be  pursued by  adding to  the budgetary discipline mles (excessive 
deficit procedure) a dissuasive effect in that national authorities would be anxious to avoid 
the suspension of payments from the Structural Funds. 
Stmctural policies aim primarily to promote medium- and long-term development with a 
view to  increasing the  lasting growth potential of economics in  difficulty.  They thereby 
contribute  to  the  continuity  of  the  corresponding  investment  measures.  In  all  the 
Member States,  and  particularly  those  covered  to  a  large  extent  by  Objective 1, 
Community stmctural resources have a structuring impact on national, regional and  local 
public expenditure. 
Consequently, their medium- and  long-term character would not be properly reflected in 
the existing mechanism of  conditionality in the Cohesion Fund. 
HO\vever,  there  is  no  incompatibility  between  national  development  and  budgetary 
convergence.  Both  theoretical  studies  and  developments  experienced  by,  for  example, 
Ireland  bear witness  to  this.  The  aim  of the  "pre-in"  countries  is  to  move  to  EMU as 
quickly as  possible, largely by means of an appropriate national budgetary strategy. This 
strategy can only reinforce the effectiveness of  the Structural Funds. 
For some Member States- the main beneficiaries of the Funds- conditionality would have 
a  more  substantial  impact  than  in  the  case of the  Cohesion Fund,  whose  resources  arc 
relatively marginal (Jess than  10%1 of the Structural Funds). Thus, for some countries, the 
combined  effect  of reductions  in  both  the  Structural  Funds  and  the  national  public 
expenditure  earmarked  for  co-financing  them  could  have  a  macroeconomic  impact  on 
growth, and therefore on the catching-up process, that would be all the more significant the 
greater such reductions were. 
If it  were  to  be  applied,  a  reduction  in  the  Structural Funds'  financial  contribution to  a 
commitment programmed on a multiannual basis would result either in the abandonment of 
the  planned  programmes  or  in  increased  burdens  for  central  government  or  even  the 
regions concerned. Such a situation could well lead to a reduction in the public expenditure 
earmarked l()r development. The financial weight of the Structural Funds in the economics 
in  question varies widely from  one case to  another. There could be  a marked imbalance 
between the excessive budget deficit in question and the economic and social consequences 
- 7 -stemming  from  the  suspension of the  Community  structural  transfer  payments.  Such  a 
suspension might  well  lead  the  Member  State  concerned  towards  a  Jess  than  optimum 
reallocation - or even to  one that ran counter to  the  necessary adjustment objectives - of 
budgetary resources in terms of  economic efficiency (passive grants). 
(b)  The objectives nnd functioning of the Structural Funds 
Conditionality, as currently applicable to the Cohesion Fund, should be assessed in relation 
to the objectives and operational arrangements of  the Structural Funds. 
Firstly, the Cohesion Fund was set up as a means of facilitating the budgetary adjustments 
necessary for the least prosperous national economies of the Union to participate in EMU. 
That is why macroeconomic conditionality, but not additionality, applies to that Fund. The 
Structural Funds  have  the  much  wider  aim  of promoting  the  overall  development  of 
regions  in  difficulty  by  establishing  the  conditions  necessary  for  their  long-term 
development.  They  therefore  provide assistance  in  the  three  key  fields  of development, 
namely economic infractructures, the improvement of human resources and the productive 
sector.  They  consequently  have  structuring  effects,  especially  as  they  have  acquired 
significant  macroeconomic  importance  for  those  Member States  widely  eligible  for 
Objective 1 assistance. 
The Cohesion Fund, through its support for the financing of transport infrastructures and 
environmental projects alone, constitutes funding that is additional to the Structural Funds. 
However,  any  suspension  of  such  funding  under  the  conditionality  clause  would 
not - owing to  the relatively marginal resource allocation - have a macroeconomic impact 
that would undermine the adjustment efforts of the economies in question. Furthermore, as 
no  cases  of  suspension  have  occurred  in  practice,  the  actual  functioning  of  the 
Cohesion Fund's  conditionality  is  based  on  very  limited  experience,  and  it  would  be 
premature to consider that such experience could be extrapolated generally. 
Secondly, the  Cohesion Fund concerns  the  Member States (eligibility  at national  level), 
whereas  the  Structural Funds  apply  to  the  development  and  conversion  of regional 
economics with problems and to  the reinforcement of measures designed to  benefit either 
specifically  targetted  groups  or  certain  active  labour  and  human  resource  policies. 
Applying the  conditionality  introduced  for  the  Cohesion Fund would have  the  effect of 
linking all the Community structural support for the regions and the development of  human 
resources to strict national budgetary discipline. 
It could prove difficult to explain to regions eligible for Structural Fund assistance, which 
in some  cases contribute themselves to the development budget and play a substantial part 
in mobilizing regional and local agents, that the Community transfer payments being made 
to  implement programmes arc  being halted  for  reasons which are  very largely or totally 
unrelated to them. 
The question of the appropriateness of such a link would arise particularly for industrial 
regions in decline (Objective 2), the other rural areas in difficulty (Objective 5b) and the 
very thinly populated northern areas (Objective 6). In most cases, these arc small or thinly 
populated areas that are  unrelated to  national  budgetary discipline.  The same applies to 
Objectives 3, 4 and Sa. 
- 8 -Furthermore, it would be difficult to  imagine limiting application of conditionality solely 
to  regions eligible for Objective 1 assistance.  Such a limitation would have the effect of 
freeing a number of the most prosperous Member States from this requirement (Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Sweden and  Finland), while the  least prosperous would potentially be the 
most  affected  by  conditionality,  and  indeed  on  two  counts  (Cohesion Fund  and 
Structural Funds) in the case of  the cohesion countries. 
At  all  events,  the  penalties  linked  to  conditionality  should  not  apply  to  those 
Structural Funds which cofinance regional and local spending. 
Conditionality  and  additionality  may  not  be  compatible.  It is  necessary  to  encourage 
nominal  convergence  because  budgetary  consolidation  and  monetary  stability  arc 
prerequisites  for  medium- and  long-term  development.  At the  same  time,  however,  the 
regional  development  process,  being  a  condition  for  sustained  development  for  which 
additionality constitutes a necessary guarantee, cannot be called into question. 
Finally,  the  programming  principle  implies continuity of Community support,  which  is 
incompatible with an interruption of  financial support. 
-9-Table 1:  Nominal effective exchange rate• and cost competitiveness2 
CHANGE%  96Ql/1987  96Ql/92Q3  96Ql/95Q2 
Nominal Effecth·e  Cost  Nominal Effective  Cost  Nominal Effective  Cost 
Exch:mge Rate  Competitiveness  Exchange Rate  Competitiveness  Exchange Rate  Competitiveness 
BLEU  12.6  7.6  9.1  8.7  -2.4  -3.7  l 
~ 
'  DEmlARK  12.7  10.7  10.9  13.8  -1.6  0.1  i 
GERl\1Al"N  17.6  17.9  13.6  14.0  -3.4  -3.9  I 
I 
! 
GREECE  -47.4  25.0  -15.7  11.7  -4.3  -2.2  i 
I 
SPAIN  -7.1  8.5  -14.7  -14.0  1.9  1.3  I 
i 
I  FRA.l'\ICE  13.9  -0.6  12.2  8.5  0.0  0.2 
I 
'  I 
a 
: 
IRELAND  0.6  -32.4  -1.9  -16.9  -0.1  -5.3 
ITALY  -26.4  -19.5  -22.8  -23.2  9.9  9.7 
:VSTHEHLANDS  12.6  -2.2  9.9  6.3  -2.1  -2.3  ' 
AUSTRIA  11.4  -3.5  8.9  6.3  -2.3  -4.0 
i 
PORTUGAL  -14.2  20.3  -7.4  1.4  -0.8  -2.5 
; 
: 
I 
'  FINLAND  -9.2  -16.1  2.9  1.3  -3.3  -0.8  I 
I 
S\VEDEN  -13.9  -9.2  -13.6  -19.5  11.2  10.0  I 
UK  -15.6  -9.1  -12.5  -7.0  -2.0  0.4  I  --
Source:  DG II-D-4  FX 
1.  The nomin:1l effective exchange rate allo-ws comparison of  the evolution of  each Member State's exchange rate with those of  other Member States. 
2.  Real effective ex-change rate b:1sed on unit iab~ur  ~osts in the manufacturing sector. 111e minus sign indicates an improvement in cost competitiveness. 